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Abstract: 
In the New-Keynesian model, optimal interest rate policy under uncertainty is formulated 
without reference to monetary aggregates as long as certain standard assumptions on the 
distributions of unobservables are satisfied. The model has been criticized for failing to 
explain common trends in money growth and inflation, and that therefore money should be 
used as a cross-check in policy formulation (see Lucas (2007)). We show that the New-
Keynesian model can explain such trends if one allows for the possibility of persistent central 
bank misperceptions. Such misperceptions motivate the search for policies that include 
additional robustness checks. In earlier work, we proposed an interest rate rule that is near-
optimal in normal times but includes a cross-check with monetary information. In case of 
unusual monetary trends, interest rates are adjusted. In this paper, we show in detail how to 
derive the appropriate magnitude of the interest rate adjustment following a significant cross-
check with monetary information, when the New-Keynesian model is the central bank’s 
preferred model. The cross-check is shown to be effective in offsetting persistent deviations 
of inflation due to central bank misperceptions. 
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Central Bank, Policy Under Uncertainty 1 Introduction
The notion that inﬂation is a monetary phenomenon is a central tenet of monetary eco-
nomics. It implies that inﬂation is ultimately a consequence of monetary policy, and the
same conclusion is applied to deﬂation. This view is usually motivated by the quantity
theory. The quantity theory states that sustained increases or decreases in the overall
price level occur along with faster or slower growth rates of monetary aggregates ad-
justed for long-run output and velocity trends. On the basis of this theory, central banks
have at times assigned an important role to monetary aggregates in the formulation of
monetary policy. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve emphasized the role of mone-
tary aggregates when Chairman Paul Volcker set out to overcome the great inﬂation in
the United States in 1979. Perhaps, he was partly following the earlier example of the
German Bundesbank that had been more successful in ﬁghting the inﬂationary impetus
of the 1970s oil price shocks with the help of monetary targets.
Recent monetary theory, however, has questioned the usefulness of monetary ag-
gregates for monetary policy. For example, Woodford (2006) asks “How important is
money in the conduct of monetary policy?”1 and responds:
“I believe that a serious examination of the reasons given thus far for as-
signing a prominent role to monetary aggregates in (policy) deliberations
provides little support for a continued emphasis on those aggregates.”
With regard to further efforts aimed at achieving a better understanding of the dynamics
of monetary aggregates Michael Woodford concludes:
“.. There is at present little reason ... to devote much attention to questions
such as the construction of improved measures of the money supply or im-
proved econometric models of money demand. For there is little intelligible
connection between those questions and the kinds of uncertainty about the
effects of monetary policy that are the actual obstacles to the development
of more effective, more reliable and more transparent ways of conducting
policy.”
These conclusions are based on the New-Keynesian model of monetary policy. This
model as laid out by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Goodfriend and King (1997)
and developed in detail in Woodford (2003) has quickly become the principal workhorse
model in monetary economics. Requiring only a small number of equations and vari-
ables the model has proved very useful in deriving several important principles for the
conduct of monetary policy (see for example, Kerr and King (1996) and Clarida et al.
1This question formed the title of his contribution to the Fourth ECB Central Banking Conference “The
Role of Money: Money and Monetary Policy in the Twenty-First Century”, November 9-10, 2006.
1(1999)). It suggests that optimal interest rate policy ought to be conducted with re-
ference to inﬂation forecasts and output gaps but without direct concern for monetary
aggregates.
The importance of monetary aggregates has also declined in central bank practice.
For example, the U.S. Fed already de-emphasized the role of monetary aggregates in
its strategy in the early 1990s, but perhaps more because of empirical difﬁculties than
because of new theories. Also, nowadays no central bank pursues a strategy of mone-
tary targeting. The Bundesbank’s difﬁculties with meeting short-term monetary growth
targets also became very apparent in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, some central banks and some monetary theorists still hold out for a
special role for money in the formulation of monetary policy. The European Central
Bank did not adopt the Bundesbank’s monetary targets but it maintains that its monetary
analysis is important enough to deserve to particular consideration separately from its
other economic analysis. Otmar Issing, the ECB’s former chief economist, describes the
separate monetary pillar in the ECB strategy as follows:
“In line with the argument of a closer relationship between money and in-
ﬂation at lower frequencies, the function ascribed to the monetary pillar is
to reveal medium-term risks to price stability ..” but “... there is no mecha-
nical monetary policy reaction to deviations of M3 growth from the refer-
ence value” and “... cross-checking the information from the economic
analysis with the information from the monetary pillar is ... a crucial ele-
ment underpinning the robustness and medium-term policy orientation.”
In a recent contribution Lucas (2007) comments on the conﬂict between the ECB’s
strategy and the ﬁndings of New Keynesian monetary theory with the following words:
“Events since 1999 have not tested the importance of the (ECB’s) second,
monetary pillar, ... I am concerned that this encouraging but brief period
of success will foster the opinion, already widely held, that the monetary
pillar is superﬂuous, and lead monetary policy analysis back to the kind of
muddled eclecticism that brought us the 1970s inﬂation.”
Robert Lucas identiﬁes New-Keynesian-style research as one of the possible culprits
stating
“One source of this concern is the increasing reliance of central bank re-
search on New-Keynesian modeling. New-Keynesian models deﬁne mone-
tary policy in terms of a choice of money market rate and so make direct
contact with central banking practice. Money supply measures play no role
in the estimation, testing or policy simulation of these models. A role for
2money in the long run is sometimes verbally acknowledged, but the models
themselves are formulated in terms of deviations from trends that are them-
selves determined somewhere off stage.”
He then goes on to propose the following strategies for research and policy making:
“It seems likely that these models could be reformulated to give a uniﬁed
account of trends, including trends in monetary aggregates, and deviations
about trend but so far they have not been. This remains an unresolved issue
on the frontier of macroeconomic theory. Until it is resolved, monetary
information should continue be used as a kind of add-on or cross-check,
just as it is in the ECB policy formulation today.”
In this paper we review the implications of the New-Keynesian model for the role
of monetary aggregates and aim to address the criticisms raised by Lucas (2007). We
elaborate on earlier work in Beck and Wieland (2008) with a more thorough and de-
tailed exposition of our analysis in the New-Keynesian model. First, we reiterate the
case for monetary policy without money. We note that it also applies under conditions
of uncertainty as long as certain standard assumptions on the distributions of unobserv-
able variables and error terms are satisﬁed. Then, we introduce persistent central bank
misperceptions regarding unobservables such as potential output or equilibrium interest
rates. Such misperceptions lead to persistent policy errors and sustained trends in money
growth and inﬂation. In this manner, we are able to provide a uniﬁed account of trends
in inﬂation and monetary aggregates as requested by Lucas (2007).
Beck and Wieland (2007a,b) proposed an interest rate rule that captures the idea of
an add-on or cross-check with monetary information in a formal manner.2 Here, we
discuss in detail how to derive the appropriate magnitude of the interest rate adjustment
following a signiﬁcant cross-check with monetary information in the New-Keynesian
model. This cross-check is shown to be effective in offsetting persistent deviations of
inﬂation in response to central bank misperceptions.
2 Optimal monetary policy without money
In the New-Keynesian model monetary aggregates play no direct role in the transmission
of monetary policy to output and inﬂation. Monetary policy decisions are made with
regard to the nominal interest rate. A change in the nominal rate affects the real interest
rate because not all prices adjust ﬂexibly and immediately. The presence of such price
2Our characterization of monetary cross-checking differs from Christiano and Rostagno (2001) who
propose an escape clause for Taylor rules that helps exclude the possibility of multiple equilibria and self-
fulﬁlling expectations. This escape clause involves a commitment to monetary targeting if money growth
gets of bounds. If effective it never needs to be implemented.
3rigidities introduces real effects of monetary policy. The real interest rate inﬂuences
aggregate demand. Thus, a change in the real rate can increase or diminish the gap
between actual output and the economy’s potential that would be realized if the price
level would be adjusting ﬂexibly. Changes in the output gap in turn impact on inﬂation
via the New-Keynesian Phillips curve.
Of course, the supply of money is inﬂuenced by the open-market operations that
the central bank conducts in order to achieve the intended rate of interest. Actual money
growth then results from the interplay of money supply and money demand in a recursive
manner. The central bank supplies sufﬁcient money to satisfy demand for real balances
at the intended rate of interest, the current price level and current income. Consequently,
the optimal interest rate policy may be characterized without any recourse to monetary
aggregates. From this perspective, efforts to construct better measures of the money sup-
ply or to obtain better empirical estimates of the parameters governing money demand
are not likely to help improve the performance of monetary policy.
In the following, we present this implication of the New-Keynesian analysis of mo-
netary policy in the context of a simple linearized version of the benchmark model
of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Goodfriend and King (1997). This model has
been used to study a variety of implications for monetary policy design. A widely-cited
example is Clarida et al. (1999). For a detailed exposition of the model and a deriva-
tion of the linear approximation the reader is referred to the inﬂuential monograph of
Woodford (2003).
The model
In its simplest form the model consists of two key equations, a forward-looking
Phillips curve derived from the ﬁrms’ pricing problem under monopolistic competition
and Calvo-style price rigidity, and an aggregate demand relation, the forward-looking
IS curve, that is derived from the households’ intertemporal Euler equation. As in
Clarida et al. (1999) a money-demand relation may be added as a third behavioral equa-
tion in the model.
The linearized Phillips curve relation determines the deviation of inﬂation, denoted
by pt, from its steady-state, p, as a function of expected future inﬂation, the output gap
and cost-push shocks:
pt ¡p = l(yt ¡zt)+b(pe
t+1jt ¡p)+ut; wherepe
t+1jt = Et[pt+1]: (1)
Expectationsregardingfutureinﬂationareformedinarational, forward-lookingmanner.
The output gap is measured as the difference between actual output, yt, and the level
of output that would be realized if prices were completely ﬂexible, zt. In the New-
Keynesian world this is the appropriate measure of potential or natural output to appear
4in the Phillips curve relation. The parameter l is a decreasing function of the discount
factor b and the share of ﬁrms that do not adjust their prices in any given period.3 The
third determinant of inﬂation in the model, the cost-push shock, is denoted by ut.
The linearized version of the New-Keynesian IS curve then relates actual output, yt,
deﬁnedaspercentage deviationfromsteadystate, toexpectedfutureoutput, theexpected
real interest rate and a demand shock:
yt = ye
t+1jt ¡j
³
it ¡pe
t+1jt
´
+gt: (2)
The real interest rate is deﬁned as the difference between the short-term nominal interest
rate, it, that is under the control of the central bank and expected inﬂation. The demand
or preference shock is denoted by gt. Clarida et al. (1999) assume that the cost-push and
demand shocks are observable at time t and follow AR(1) processes, i.e.
ut = ruut¡1+hu
t ; (3)
gt = rggt¡1+h
g
t (4)
with 0 · ru;rg < 1 and (h
g
t ;hu
t ) representing mean-zero, i.i.d. disturbances. The unre-
alistic observability assumption will be abandoned further on in this paper.
We also follow Clarida et al. (1999) in modeling money demand. Demand for real
balances is inﬂuenced by the demand for transactions as measured by aggregate income,
the opportunity cost as measured by the nominal money market rate and other factors
captured by shocks. The respective money demand equation is given by:
mt ¡ pt = gyyt ¡giit +st: (5)
Here, mt refers to the logarithm of nominal money balances and pt to the (log of) the
price level. Thus, Dpt = pt. gy denotes the income elasticity and gi the semi-interest rate
elasticity of money demand. Money demand shocks, st, are normally distributed with
mean zero and variance s2
s. It is possible to derive this speciﬁcation of money demand
from ﬁrst principles. As shown in Woodford (2003) it requires that utility is separable in
consumption and real money balances. Theoretical foundations for a direct role of real
money balances in the IS and Phillips curves can be obtained when household utility
is not separable in money and consumption. Empirical studies, however, have failed to
detect strong direct effects (cf. Ireland (2004) and Andres et al. (2006)) of real balances.
Thus, we will exclude this possibility in the remainder of the paper, while exploring
other roles for money in monetary policy design.
3More precisely, the parameter l is given by the following expression: l=(1¡q)(1¡bq)(q)¡1; where
q denotes the proportion of ﬁrms that are not allowed to adjust their prices in a given period.
5Optimal interest rate policy
The optimal interest rate policy is determined from the perspective of the central
bank’s chosen objective. For simplicity, we focus on the objective of a central bank that
strictly concentrates on stabilizing actual inﬂation, pt, close to its target denoted by p¤,
max¡
1
2
Et
(
¥
å
i=0
bi£
(pt+i¡p¤)2¤
)
; (6)
subject to the Phillips curve and the IS curve deﬁned by equations (1) and (2). The
inﬂation target is normalized at zero, p¤ = 0. The term “strict inﬂation targeting” used
to describe this strategy was coined by Svensson (1997). It implies that the central bank
focuses exclusively on stabilizing inﬂation without assigning any weight to economic
activity in the policy objective.
The associated ﬁrst-order condition is
E[pt+ijt] = p¤ = 0 8i = f0;1;2;::;¥g (7)
where pt+i depends on the output gap, yt+i ¡zt+i, according to the New-Keynesian
Phillips curve. We assume that information is symmetric. The central bank and mar-
ket participants share the same information. It follows that the central bank and market
participants expect future inﬂation to be equal to the target rate of zero:
pe
t+1jt = 0: (8)
Normally, it would be important to discuss at this point whether the central bank is
able credibly commit to a policy rule, or whether policy is to be analyzed under the
assumption of discretion. However, in the case of a strict-inﬂation-targeting central bank
the optimal policies under commitment and under discretion are identical and follow
from the preceding ﬁrst-order condition.
Solving the Phillips curve for yt and applying pe
t+1jt = 0 yields the level of output
that would be compatible with the expected rate of inﬂation in period t:4
yt = zt ¡
1
l
ut: (9)
Similarly, the level of output in period t+1 that would be consistent with optimal policy
under current information is given by:
ye
t+1jt = ze
t+1jt ¡
ru
l
ut: (10)
The appropriate level of the nominal interest rate that achieves the central bank’s objec-
4Here, steady-state inﬂation p is normalized at zero consistent with the inﬂation target.
6tive can then be derived from equation (2), the New-Keynesian IS curve, evaluated at the
intended levels of output and inﬂation for periods t and t +1:
zt ¡
1
l
ut = ze
t+1¡
ru
l
ut ¡j(it ¡0)+gt: (11)
Thus, the optimal interest rate, it, is:
it =
1
j
µ
ze
t+1jt ¡zt +
1¡ru
l
ut +gt
¶
: (12)
This characterization of optimal interest rate policy has several interesting implications
regarding the role of money in monetary policy design. As previously stated the mon-
etary aggregate, mt, plays no role in the characterization of optimal interest rate policy.
Therefore, improvements in the measurement of monetary aggregates are not likely to
improve policy design. Furthermore, the money demand relation, equation (5), is not
used in the derivation of the optimal interest rate policy. Thus, money demand param-
eters do not appear in the optimal policy. Rather, the parameters of the Phillips curve
and IS curve turn out to be of importance. This result reinforces the conclusion that
research efforts be better spent on obtaining better estimates of the slope of the Phillips
curve or the interest-rate elasticity of aggregate demand than estimates of the income-
and interest-rate elasticities of money demand.
To be clear, the central bank achieves the desired interest rate setting by conducting
open-market operations that inﬂuence the money supply. Thus, the money supply is
determined according to the money demand equation (5) consistently with the desired
policy rate, current output and the price level. However, money does not appear as a
variable in the central bank’s optimal interest rate rule and the remainder of the economy
is automatically insulated from money demand shocks. Thus, the case for monetary
policy design without money directly follows from the New-Keynesian model.
One difference between the optimal interest rate policy given by equation (12) and
the characterizations reported by Clarida et al. (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) is the presence of current and expected future potential output, zt and zt+1. This
apparent difference is easily reconciled. For example, if potential output equals steady-
state output one obtains the optimal policy from Clarida et al. (1999):
it =
1¡ru
jl
ut +
1
j
gt: (13)
It implies that the central bank acts to fully offset the effects of both demand and cost-
push shocks on inﬂation under a strict-inﬂation targeting regime. In Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) potential output may deviate from steady-state output in response to
particular shocks. For example, they incorporate government spending and include a
government spending shock in place of the demand or preference shock in Clarida et al.
7(1999). As a result, potential or ﬂexible-price output partly moves with the government
spending shock. Furthermore, changes in productivity such as technology shocks are
typically assumed to be important drivers of potential output.
A crucial weakness of the above characterization of optimal interest rate policy is
that it is not implementable in practice. Neither current potential output, nor future
potential output, nor cost-push shocks, nor demand shocks, nor technology shocks are
directly observable. All these variables are unknowns that need to be estimated condi-
tional on a particular model of the economy.
This weakness can be addressed by relaxing the assumption of full information on
behalf of the central bank and market participants. In doing so we will continue to treat
the central bank and market participants symmetrically. In other words, we will continue
to assume that they share the same beliefs regarding the appropriate model of the econ-
omy.
Introducing imperfect knowledge
In the following, we introduce imperfect knowledge regarding economic shocks and
unobservable variables such as potential output into the analysis. The superscript e is
usedtorefertothecentralbank’sandpublic’sestimatesorperceptions. Thus,ze
tjt denotes
the central bank’s estimate of potential output in periodt given the information available
at that point in time. Similarly, ue
tjt, ge
tjt and se
tjt refer to the central bank’s estimates of
these particular economic shocks. We assume that these perceptions represent the best
available estimates of the unobservables from the perspective of the central bank. These
estimates form the basis for the central bank’s forecast of periodt inﬂation, pe
tjt =E[ptjt],
at the point in period t when it decides on its policy before it can observe the joint
consequences of potential output, the cost-push shock and its policy choice on inﬂation.
Fortunately, the optimal policy under uncertainty can be determined quite easily if
the following conditions are fulﬁlled: the model is linear, the parameters are treated as
known and uncertainty is additive. In this case, certainty-equivalence applies. Or in
other words, the optimal policy must continue to satisfy the same ﬁrst-order condition
as before, equation (7), with the expectation conditional on the above estimates (see
for example Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Wieland (2006)).5 Thus, the optimal
output level in periodt is determined similarly to equation (9) but now in expected terms
based on the best available estimates of the cost-push shock and current potential output:
ye
tjt = ze
tjt ¡
1
l
ue
tjt: (14)
The conditions for certainty-equivalence — linearity, known parameters and additive
5Certainty-equivalence fails if multiplicative parameters such as l are unknown. Then, the cen-
tral bank faces a complex control and estimation problem. Examples are studied by Wieland (2000),
Beck and Wieland (2002) and Wieland (2006).
8uncertainty — require making important a-priori assumptions regarding the processes
that determine unobservable variables. Svensson and Woodford (2003), for example,
assume that potential output, zt, in the New-Keynesian model follows an auto-regressive
process,
zt = rzzt¡1+ez
t; (15)
with known persistence parameter, rz, and known variance, sez. This strategy is often
employed in studies of optimal policy under uncertainty. Another example is Wieland
(2006) who makes a similar assumption regarding the natural rate of unemployment in
a model of the Phillips curve with backward- and forward-looking elements.
Withregardtothecost-pushshockaswellasthedemandandmoney-demandshocks,
we use another commonly employed assumption. Central bank and market participants
only obtain noisy signals denoted by ue
t;ge
t and se
t. Thus, the true shocks are related to
these signals according to
ut = ue
t +eu
t (16)
gt = ge
t +e
g
t (17)
st = se
t +es
t (18)
where eu
t , e
g
t , and es
t are Gaussian white noise processes with zero mean and known
variances, eu
t , e
g
t , and es
t. Consequently the best estimates of the shocks correspond to
ue
tjt = ue
t, ge
tjt = ge
t and se
tjt = se
t.
Given the above-mentioned assumptions the central bank can solve the estimation
problem separately from the optimal policy problem. Svensson and Woodford (2003)
and Wieland (2006) show how to derive the optimal estimate of potential output, ze
tjt,
using the Kalman ﬁlter. Conditional on this estimate the optimal policy implies setting
the nominal interest rate, it, so as to achieve the output level deﬁned by (14) in expecta-
tion. The appropriate interest rate may be inferred from the IS equation (11). Thus, the
optimal policy under imperfect knowledge corresponds to:
it =
1
j
µ
ze
t+1jt ¡ze
tjt +
1¡ru
l
ue
t +ge
t
¶
: (19)
Introducing imperfect knowledge per se does not change our earlier conclusions. Op-
timal interest rate policy is deﬁned without any reference to monetary aggregates. Im-
proved information on money does not help improve the performance of interest rate
policy.
As noted previously, the optimal policy depends importantly on the central bank’s
estimate of potential output, ztjt. A possible route for further investigation would be to
follow Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Wieland (2006) and study the performance
of policy conditional on an a-priori assumption concerning the unobservable process of
9potential output such as equation (15). Clearly, ﬁndings obtained in this manner would
only be reliable if potential output truly obeys such a process.
Instead, we pursue a different strategy in our further analysis. This strategy follows
the inﬂuential study of Orphanides (2003). It implies evaluating policy performance for
particular scenarios with persistent deviations of the central bank’s estimates of potential
outputfrom the true values. Orphanides et al.(2000) andOrphanides(2003) showedthat
historical output gap estimates have been revised repeatedly. The revisions were due to
changing views on the appropriate estimate of potential output. Relative to the ﬁnal
estimate of potential output obtained many years later, the Federal Reserve’s real-time
estimates indicate highly persistent misperceptions.6 Similar misperceptions occurred in
other countries. Gerberding et al. (2006), for example, provide data on German output
gap misperceptions. If a central bank relies on such potential output measures in real
time policy making, its policy stance may be biased for a sustained period of time.
Thus, we consider the possibility that the central bank and the public may make
persistent mistakes in estimating the natural output level – even if they obtain those
estimates using all available information conditional on their preferred model and es-
timation method. The estimate, ze
tjt, differs from the true level, zt, to the extent of the
misperception, et:
ze
tjt = zt +et: (20)
The misperception, et, affects the ﬁnal outcomes for aggregate output, money growth
and inﬂation via central bank policy and market participants’ expectations. The resulting
level of output is given by:
yt = ye
t+1jt ¡j
³
it ¡pe
t+1jt
´
+gt
= ze
t+1jt ¡
ru
l
ue
t ¡j
µ
1
j
µ
ze
t+1jt ¡ze
tjt +
1¡ru
l
ue
t +ge
t
¶
¡0
¶
+gt
= zt +et ¡
1
l
ue
t +e
g
t : (21)
If the central bank overestimates potential output by et, its policy will increase the output
gap, yt ¡zt, by the same amount et. As a result, inﬂation will increase by let over and
6The output gap data for the 1980s and 1990s of Orphanides (2003) was constructed from the Green-
book, the Federal Reserve document summarizing the Board staff’s analysis of economic developments
distributed to the FOMC members a few days before each FOMC meeting. For the 1960s and 1970s Or-
phanides could not recover a complete time series for potential output estimates from Federal Reserve
sources but notes that discussion of output gap measures appeared in the FOMC Memorandum of Discus-
sion throughout this period. Thus, he uses real-time estimates of potential output that were produced by the
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in those years and available at FOMC meetings. Orphanides et al.
(2000) estimate a worst-case process of misperceptions with a near unit-root (0.96) and standard deviation
of 3.77% using quarterly revisions from 1966 to 1994.
10above the unavoidable ﬂuctuations due to the noise terms e
g
t and eu
t :
pt = l(yt ¡zt)+bpe
t+1jt +ut
= l(zt +et ¡
1
l
ue
t +e
g
t ¡zt)+b¤0+ut
= let +le
g
t +eu
t (22)
Inﬂation consequently inherits the persistence properties of the central bank mispercep-
tions. Trend increases or decreases in inﬂation may therefore be caused by such misper-
ceptions. This point has been made by Orphanides (2003) for the case of a traditional
Keynesian-style model with backward-looking expectations formation. In the present
paper and in Beck and Wieland (2008) it is extended to the New-Keynesian model with
rational expectations. The next step is to address the request of Lucas (2007) and in-
vestigate whether the New-Keynesian model with persistent misperceptions may give a
uniﬁed account of trends, including trends in monetary aggregates.
3 The long-run link between money and inﬂation and the con-
sequences of persistent central bank misperceptions
Researchers and policymakers that are in favor of assigning a special role to money
in monetary policy design typically emphasize the long-run link between money and
inﬂation, or in other words, the quantity theory. This long-run relation is consistent with
the New-Keynesian model discussed in the preceding section. Taking ﬁrst differences
and re-arranging the money demand equation (5) we obtain a short-run link between
money and inﬂation:
pt = Dpt = Dmt ¡gyDyt +giDit ¡Dst: (23)
D is the ﬁrst-difference operator. Long-run equilibrium values can then be determined as
follows. In the long-run, money demand shocks would average to zero, and the nominal
interest rate would settle down to its steady state level, which is the sum of the equi-
librium real interest rate and the inﬂation target. Thus, the change in the interest rate
would similarly converge to zero. The long-run link between inﬂation, money growth
and output growth then corresponds to:
p = Dm¡gyDy = µ: (24)
11This relationship also incorporates the long-run trend in velocity. Thus, long-run inﬂa-
tion is proportional to long-run money growth adjusted for output and velocity trends.7
Recent studies obtained empirical support for this long-run relationship by compa-
ring money and inﬂation trends estimated with different ﬁltering methods.8 Even more
interestingly, they claim that money growth leads inﬂation at low frequencies. To give
an example, Gerlach (2004) uses the following ﬁlter
µ
f
t = µ
f
t¡1+w
³
µt ¡µ
f
t¡1
´
(25)
to approximate long-run values of inﬂation and money growth. In his work, µt, may
alternatively stand for money growth, Dmt, or money growth adjusted for output growth.
In this paper we adjust money growth as indicated by equation (24) using the estimate
of the income-elasticity of money demand, i.e.
µ
f
t = Dm
f
t ¡gyDy
f
t : (26)
In order to show that introducing persistent central bank misperceptions into the
New-Keynesian model is sufﬁcient to generate similar trend movements in money and
inﬂation — the challenge posed by Lucas — we calibrate and simulate the model under
imperfect knowledge. The calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 1. The
economic parameters (b;j;l;gy;gi) are set at values consistent with other studies in
the New-Keynesian literature. The variances of the economic shocks are all set to 0.8.
The variance of the noise terms is smaller with regard to money than with regard to
output and inﬂation, because monetary data is available earlier at monthly frequency
and subject to less revision (see Coenen et al. (2005)). The persistence of the economic
shocks, (ru;rg), is set to zero. The ﬁltering parameter, w, is set in line with values
investigated by Gerlach (2004).
To illustrate the effect of sustained misperceptions we construct a simple example.
This particular series of output gap misperceptions measured in percentage point terms
was also previously used in Beck and Wieland (2007a) in the context of a model with
7Speciﬁcally, with velocity deﬁned as vt ´ ¡mt + pt +yt and money demand determined by equation
(5) the long-run trend in velocity corresponds to Dv = (1¡gy)Dy. Changes in the trend in velocity may
arise from changes in potential output growth y, changes in the income elasticity of money demand, gy, and
possibly from other sources such as ﬁnancial innovations (see Orphanides and Porter (2001) and Masuch et
al. (2001)).
8See for example Gerlach (2004), Benati (2005), Pill and Rautananen (2006) and Assemacher-Wesche
and Gerlach (2007).
12Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Economic interpretation
b 0.99 Discount factor of the policy maker.
¡j -1 Real interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand (in line
with Andres et al. (2006) and Ireland (2004)).
q 0.5 Proportion of ﬁrms that adjust prices in a given period
(based on Bils and Klenow (2004)). As a result l = 0:5
rounded.
gy 0.1 Income elasticity of money demand (in line with
Andres et al. (2006) and Ireland (2004)).
¡gi -0.4 Interest rate elasticity of money demand (in line with
Andres et al. (2006) and Ireland (2004)).
w 0.2 Weighting parameter of ﬁlter (broadly in line with
Gerlach (2004)).
p? 0 Inﬂation target.
ru;rg 0 Persistence of cost-push and aggregate demand shocks.
sg;su;ss 0.8 Standard deviation of cost-push, demand and money-
demand shocks.
shu 0.6 Standard deviation of noise of cost-push shocks.
shg 0.4 Standard deviation of noise of demand shock.
shs 0.1 Standard deviation of noise of money-demand shocks.
backward-looking expectations formation.
for t = (1;10) e(t) = 0
for t = (11;12;13;14) e(t) = (1;2;3;4)
for t = (15;100) e(t) = 4
for t = (101;102;103) e(t) = (3;2;1)
for t = (104;200) e(t) = 1:
(27)
The central bank’s initial estimate of potential output is assumed to coincide with the
true value. In periods 11 to 14 the central bank overestimates potential output growth
by 1 percentage point per period. As a consequence, the central bank’s and the public’s
estimate of the output gap is 4 percentage points lower than the true output gap from
period 15 onwards. As a result of this mistake the central bank will induce a level of
output that is 4 percentage points above potential on average. Ultimately, this policy
bias induces an increase in average inﬂation of about 2 percentage points. This value
corresponds to (l et). Accordingly, average money growth will also tend to rise by 2
percentage points. From period 100 onwards the central bank’s overestimate of potential
output declines to 1 percentage point and the resulting deviation in average inﬂation to
0.5 percentage points.
A simulation of the consequences of output gap misperceptions under the optimal
policy in the New-Keynesian model is shown in Figure 1 for a single draw of normally-
distributed cost-push, demand and money-demand shocks and noise terms. Due to an
13Figure 1: Output Gap Misperceptions and the Money-Inﬂation Link
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interest rate policy that is more accommodative than the central bank believes to be the
case, money growth and inﬂation rise. This increase is persistent due to persistent central
bank misperceptions regarding potential output. Over time, also the ﬁltered measures of
money growth, Dmf, and inﬂation, pf, increase. An apparent trend change in nominal
variables occurs.
The simulation reported in Figure 1 suggests that the introduction of imperfect
knowledge and persistent central bank misperceptions is sufﬁcient to provide a uni-
ﬁed account of monetary and inﬂation trends – the unresolved issue on the frontier of
macroeconomic theory noted by Robert E. Lucas. Of course, the series of mispercep-
tions simulated above is an ad-hoc choice. However, empirical observations of central
bank misperceptions are available for the United States and Germany from Orphanides
(2003) and Gerberding et al. (2006). Beck and Wieland (2008) show that these historical
misperceptions also generate similar trends in money growth and inﬂation.
Another potential source of inﬂation trends that has been considered in empirical
estimations of the New-Keynesian model is the inﬂation target. A common assumption
is to model the central bank’s inﬂation target as a random walk. Our explanation based
on persistent policy mistakes due to persistent misperceptions regarding unobservables
applies in the case of a constant inﬂation target. It makesuse of the empirical observation
of persistent output gap revisions and does not require random changes in the central
bank’s inﬂation objective.
With regard to the simulation in Figure 1 one may ask why the central bank does not
realize that its perceptions are biased, raises interest rates to a higher level and thereby
14ensures that inﬂation returns to target relatively quickly. The reason is simple. Optimal
monetary policy takes account of the best available forecast for inﬂation. This forecast,
which is based on an incorrect output gap, states that inﬂation will return to target due
to the belief that aggregate demand is consistent with price stability. If the central bank
were to raise interest rates further, its own forecast would indicate a recession and un-
dershooting of its inﬂation target. The persistent bias in the forecast implies that the
central bank is attributing successive periods of high inﬂation to a sequence of unfavor-
able shocks rather than a mistaken output gap estimate. This example is not without
parallel in reality considering the account of the 1970s inﬂation in the United States in
Orphanides (2003).
4 An interest rate policy with monetary cross-checking
Based on the empirical evidence on money growth and inﬂation trends, Lucas (2007)
suggested to continue using information on monetary aggregates as an add-on or cross-
check in interest rate policy. In this spirit, we have formulated an interest rate rule with
monetary cross-checking in Beck and Wieland (2007a). It consists of two components:
it = iNK
t +iCC
t : (28)
The ﬁrst component, denoted by the superscript NK, refers to the optimal interest rate
policy in the New-Keynesian model as deﬁned by equation (19) in section 2. The second
component, denoted by the superscript CC, refers to an additive adjustment in interest
rate setting due to monetary cross-checking.
What is the purpose of having two components? If the central bank believes in the
New-Keynesian model, the available information and estimates indicate that iNK
t is the
optimal policy choice under uncertainty. In the case of persistent output gap mispercep-
tions, the model-based forecast will indicate that a sequence of inﬂationary shocks is the
source of the observed upward shift in inﬂation rather than a deviation of output from
potential. It is important to understand that this assessment also incorporates informa-
tion on monetary aggregates. The New-Keynesian model will attribute the upward shift
in money growth to the same source. Money is not a neglected information variable.
Conditional on the model and the model-consistent output gap estimate money growth
does not provide further information affecting the model forecast. The reason is that the
level of output and inﬂation are observed directly. If output, inﬂation and money growth
were afﬂicted with measurement error, money would provide further information that
would help improve estimates of current output and inﬂation. This information role is
investigated by Coenen et al. (2005), but plays no role in the present paper.
Instead, the idea of cross-checking is motivated from the perspective of model un-
15certainty and the search for robustness in policy design. The proposal is to base policy
on the preferred model in normal times, but to check policy outcomes regularly against
another simpler model. In this paper, the preferred model is the New-Keynesian model
of section 2. The simpler model used for cross-checking is the long-run relationship
between money and inﬂation implied by the quantity theory. Of course, as shown in the
preceding section, this long-run relationship between money and inﬂation is part of the
New-Keynesian model as well. It is interesting from a robustness perspective, because it
also holds in cases where the New-Keynesian model fails, for example, in an economy
that is better characterized by a model without price rigidities. Ideally, the regular cross-
check should not lead to deviation from the New-Keynesian interest rate policy, iNK
t , in
normal times, that is in the absence of persistent central bank misperceptions regarding
unobservable measures such as the output gap. However, the cross-check should trig-
ger a policy adjustment, iCC
t , if trend money growth deviates from a rate consistent with
stable inﬂation in a statistically unusually persistent manner. This statistical test may be
based on the null hypothesis that the preferred model is correct.
As shown by Beck and Wieland (2008) the policy with cross-checking can be de-
rived from a ﬁrst-order condition that includes trend inﬂation. To illustrate the reasoning
we start by reiterating the ﬁrst-order condition that describes the optimal policy derived
under certainty-equivalence:
E[pt+i¡p¤jt] = 0 8i = f0;1;2;::;¥g (29)
It implies that trend inﬂation equals the inﬂation target in expectation. Speciﬁcally,
E[pt+Njt] ! E[p] as N ! ¥, and consequently E[p] = p¤ = 0.
Thus, a central bank that relies on the New-Keynesian model expects that trend inﬂa-
tion will turn out to match the target as long as policy is set to stabilize expected inﬂation
in every period. However, such conﬁdence in model-based forecasts and estimates of un-
observable variables may be misplaced. Following Lucas’ recommendation, a sceptical
policy maker may instead consider a simpler model of trend inﬂation. A good candi-
date is the long-run relationship between money and inﬂation derived from the quantity
equation:
E[p] = E[µf] (30)
A “monetarist” central bank that exclusively uses this model of trend inﬂation to inform
policy would conduct open-market operations in period t such that trend inﬂation as
estimated by the most recent observation on ﬁltered adjusted money growth is expected
to equal the inﬂation target:
E[pjµ
f
t ] = p¤ = 0: (31)
µ
f
t can be monitored without relying on model-based estimates of potential output. As
16a result, the central bank can stabilize trend inﬂation in spite of output gap mispercep-
tions.9
Clearly, such an approach may appeal to traditional strict monetarists. In our view,
however, itwouldbeamistaketoabandonanyattemptatshort-runinﬂationstabilization.
After all, the New-Keynesian model may not be that far off the mark and potential output
estimates need not always be utterly wrong. Instead, we consider the monetary model of
trend inﬂation for cross-checking purposes. Speciﬁcally, the central bank is instructed
to check every period whether ﬁltered money growth is still consistent with attaining the
inﬂation target or whether trend money growth has shifted. This check is accomplished
by monitoring the test statistic,
kt =
µ
f
t ¡p¤
sµf
; (32)
and comparing it to a critical value kcrit. Here, sµf denotes the standard deviation of the
ﬁltered money growth measure. It can be determined under the null hypothesis that the
central bank’s preferred model, that is the New-Keynesian model is correct.
As long as the test statistic does not signal a sustained shift in ﬁltered money growth,
the central bank implements the optimal policy under the preferred Keynesian-style
model. This is the policy that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition (7). As a result it will
stabilize short-run inﬂation variations very effectively in the absence of persistent out-
put gap misperceptions. Once the central bank receives successive signals of a shift in
trend inﬂation as estimated by ﬁltered money growth, i.e. (kt > kcrit for N periods) or
(kt < ¡kcrit for N periods), policy is adjusted so as to control trend inﬂation.
The two policy parameters kcrit and N play different roles. kcrit reﬂects the proba-
bility that an observed deviation of µf from p? is purely accidental (for example a 5%
or 1% signiﬁcance level). N deﬁnes the number of successive deviations in excess of
this critical value. Thus, the greater N the longer the central bank waits to accumulate
evidence of a sustained policy bias. The chosen values are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameters of the Cross-Checking Component of Monetary Policy
Parameter Value Economic interpretation
sµf 0.54 Standard deviation of µf given the calibration of the
model equations in Table 1.
kcrit 1.96 5% critical value for the cross-checking rule.
N 4 Number of periods required for a sustained deviation in
the cross-checking rule.
The optimal size of the cross-checking adjustment can be derived from a ﬁrst-order
9Of course, a natural question concerns the implications of sustained velocity shifts for this strategy
of stabilizing trend inﬂation. This possibility is investigated in Beck and Wieland (2008). There we show
that simple recursive estimation of money demand parameters would be effective in avoiding incorrect
cross-checks.
17condition that includes the expectation of trend inﬂation based on the simple monetary
model. It is used to augment the inﬂation forecast based on the New-Keynesian (NK)
model:
E[ptjze
tjt; NK Model]+E[pjµ
f
k] = 0 (33)
This condition guarantees that the central bank counteracts a signiﬁcant shift in trend
inﬂation estimated on the basis of ﬁltered money growth. µ
f
k denotes the most recent
signiﬁcant estimate of a trend shift in period k, i.e. (kk > kcrit;::;kk¡N > kcrit) or (kk <
¡kcrit;::;kk¡N < ¡kcrit).
To derive the interest rate adjustment following a signiﬁcant cross-check it is im-
portant to consider its effect on market participants’ expectations of future inﬂation.
Of course, initially neither the central bank nor market participants will expect cross-
checking to kick in, because expectations are formed conditional on the New-Keynesian
model and the associated estimate of potential output. The probability that the test statis-
tic k exceeds the critical value under the null hypothesis is negligible, and even more so
the probability that it exceeds kcrit for N periods. Thus, in the absence of a signiﬁcant
cross-check the expectations for inﬂation in period t under the null hypothesis of the
New-Keynesian model and the potential output estimate ze
tjt are given by
pe
tjt = 0: (34)
Once a signiﬁcant cross-check occurs, policy is governed by the ﬁrst-order condition
with the monetary estimate of trend inﬂation from then onwards. As a consequence:
pe
tjt = ¡µ
f
k (35)
Thus, under symmetric information the central bank and market participants will expect
current inﬂation – conditional on the New-Keynesian model and potential output esti-
mate – to fall below the target to the extent of the trend inﬂation estimate provided by
ﬁltered money growth.
To solve the New-Keynesian Phillips curve for the expected output level that the
central bank should aim at according to the policy with cross-checking, it is necessary to
characterize market participants’ expectation of inﬂation in period t +1. In doing so we
focus on the case of policy under discretion. In this case, the central bank cannot mani-
pulate market participants’ inﬂation expectations by promising to commit to delivering
future inﬂation outcomes that are inconsistent with its objective function. Therefore,
under discretion market participants expect future inﬂation to return to the zero inﬂation
target of the central bank, i.e. pe
t+1jt = 0.
Then, the Phillips curve is solved for the level of output that the central bank expects
18to achieve in period t, ye
tjt. Using pe
t+1jt = 0 and pe
tjt = ¡µk
f one obtains
ye
tjt = ze
tjt +
1
l
pe
tjt ¡
b
l
pe
t+1jt ¡
1
l
ue
tjt (36)
= ze
tjt ¡
1
l
ue
tjt ¡
1
l
µk
f:
Market participants’ expectation of output in period t +1 may be characterized in a
similar manner. Consistent with the expectation that inﬂation will be equal to the target
in periodt+1, market participants expect output to be equal to potential output in period
t +1:
ye
t+1jt = ze
t+1jt ¡
ru
l
ue
tjt: (37)
In the next step, the IS curve is solved for the interest rate, it, consistent with the above
expressions for ye
tjt, ye
t+1jt and pe
t+1jt. This yields the interest rate policy with cross-
checking:
it = 0¡
1
j
µ
ze
tjt ¡
1
l
ue
tjt ¡
1
l
µk
f
¶
+
1
j
³
ze
t+1jt ¡
ru
l
ue
tjt
´
+
1
j
ge
tjt (38)
=
1
j
µ
ze
t+1jt ¡ze
tjt +
1¡ru
l
ue
tjt +ge
tjt
¶
+
1
lj
µk
f
= iNK
t +
1
lj
µk
f: (39)
It turns out that the appropriate adjustment to interest rate policy for the periods follow-
ing a signiﬁcant cross-check is given by iCC
t = 1
ljµk
f. The dynamic characterization of
interest rate policy then corresponds to:
it =
8
> <
> :
iNK
t +( 1
jl)(µ
f
k) if (kt > kcrit;::;kt¡N > kcrit)
or (kt < ¡kcrit;::;kt¡N < ¡kcrit)
iNK
t +0 else.
) (40)
Next, we aim to show that the interest rate policy with cross-checking provides a
convenient and effective avenue for correcting the central bank’s policy bias that lead to
the sustained increase in ﬁltered money growth and inﬂation in the preceding simulation.
To this end, we repeat the simulation of Figure 1 using the policy deﬁned by equation
(40). The outcome is reported in Figure 2. The panel with actual money growth, Dm,
is omitted. Instead we include a panel reporting the misperception in the central bank’s
estimate of potential output, et, and the adjustment in interest rates due to monetary
cross-checking, iCC
t .
The policy with cross-checking responds to the increase in ﬁltered money growth,
µ
f
t , fairlyquicklyafterthepolicybiashasarisen. Theinterestrateadjustmentof( 1
lj)(µ
f
k)
almost perfectly offsets the policy bias due to the output gap misperception, (et). Once
19Figure 2: Output Gap Misperceptions and Monetary Cross-Checking
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the misperception of potential output declines after period 100 cross-checking soon leads
to another adjustment of interest rates.
To assess the sensitivity of our ﬁndings we draw 1000 series of shocks of 200 periods
length from a normal distribution and use them to conduct a set of alternative simula-
tions. Some of the ﬁndings are reported in Figure 3. The bottom right panel of Figure 3
reports the average path of the interest rate adjustment due to monetary cross-checking,
i.e. iCC
t , over 1000 simulations under the same parameter settings as in the single simu-
lation displayed in Figure 2. This panel conﬁrms that, on average, cross-checking leads
to the appropriate interest rate adjustments offsetting the policy bias due to output gap
misperceptions.
20Figure 3: Sensitivity Analysis: Averages over 1000 Simulations
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5 Conclusions and Outlook
In this paper, we have presented the case for monetary policy without money in the New-
Keynesian model. This analysis supports Michael Woodford’s conclusion that monetary
aggregates do not play an important role in optimal interest rate policy. Furthermore,
we have shown that the empirical observation of similar trends in money growth and
inﬂation is not in itself a reason to discard the New-Keynesian model. Similar long-run
trendsofmoneygrowthandinﬂationcanbeexplainedwithintheNew-Keynesianmodel.
Our analysis indicates that such trends would emerge as a consequence of a sustained
policy bias. A possible source of this bias are persistent central bank misperceptions
regarding unobservable potential output. Empirical evidence on the existence of such
misperceptions is available for the United States and Germany.
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that monetary aggregates can play a useful role in designing a
robust monetary policy strategy. In particular, it may be useful to augment the optimal
model-basedinterestratepolicywithamonetarycross-checkifthecentralbank’smodel-
based estimates of unobservables such as potential output embody persistent mispercep-
tions. Such a cross-check can help correcting the policy bias due to misperceptions by
adding an adjustment to the interest rate prescription from the central bank’s preferred
New-Keynesian model that is derived from a money-based estimate of trend inﬂation.
This adjustment would not be made in normal times, but only when the money-based
estimate of trend inﬂation has deviated in an unusual and persistent manner from tar-
21get. The optimal interest policy prescription from the preferred New-Keynesian model
does not adjust automatically, because the central bank’s output gap estimate and model-
based forecast interpret the change in inﬂation simply as the outcome of a particularly
unfavorable series of shocks.
In Beck and Wieland (2007a,b) we have noted the similarity between monetary
cross-checking as deﬁned above and the ECB’s claim that it bases its interest-rate de-
cisions on a strategy with two main components or pillars. In particular, the ECB’s
strategy is not exclusively focused on short- to medium-run determinants of inﬂation,
but also includes a separate, long-run oriented monetary analysis. The ECB website
describes these two components as follows:
“Economic analysis assesses the short to medium-term determinants of
price developments. The focus is on real activity and ﬁnancial conditions
in the economy. The economic analysis takes account of the fact that price
developments over those horizons are inﬂuenced largely by the interplay of
supply and demand in the goods, services and factor markets.”
“Monetary analysis focuses on a longer-term horizon than the economic
analysis. It exploits the long-run link between money and prices. The mone-
tary analysis mainly serves as a means of cross-checking, from a medium to
long-term perspective, the short to medium-term indications for monetary
policy coming from the economic analysis.”
We are tempted to associate the ECB’s “economic analysis” with the optimal interest
rate policy derived from the New-Keynesian model, denoted by iNK
t in this paper. Our
reasoning for this association is that this setting of the interest rate will ensure that short-
to medium-run inﬂationary risks based on a forward-looking Phillips curve and excess
aggregate demand are perfectly controlled. Similarly, we are tempted to associate the
ECB’s “monetary analysis” with the cross-checking adjustment, denoted by iCC
t . As out-
lined in the preceding section this adjustment exploits the long-run link between money
and prices. However, we note that the ECB has refrained from providing a formal quan-
titative exposition of the conduct and combination of its “economic” and “monetary”
analysis. Therefore, this association remains speculative and in need of further empiri-
cal investigation.
Our deﬁnition of a policy with cross-checking would also allow incorporating cross-
checks regarding other estimates of trend inﬂation. While the quantity theory suggests
ﬁltered money growth as an obvious candidate, past measures of ﬁltered inﬂation would
work as well (see Beck and Wieland (2008)). However, those staff in charge of inﬂation
forecasting may be reluctant to insist on an additional policy response to past inﬂation
that would lead them to predict an under- or over-shooting of inﬂation conditional on
the preferred model of inﬂation. For this reason, one could also speculate whether such
22an insistence on reacting to past outcomes is perhaps better incorporated in the context
of a long-run monetary analysis conducted separately from those in charge of short-run
inﬂation forecasting in a central bank.
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